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VERBATIM STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW
A.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

1.

UNITED STATES CONST, amend VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

v.

2.

UNITED STATES CONST, amend XIV:

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
B.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

1.

ART. I §1:

All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to the
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
2.

CONST. OF UTAH Article I §7:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
3.

CONST. OF UTAH Article I §12:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
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speedy pubic trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
4.

ART. VIII §2:

The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and
shall consist of at least five justices. the number of
justices may be changed by statute, but no change shall
have the effect of removing a justice from office. A
chief justice shall be selected from among the justices
of the Supreme Court as provided by statute. The chief
justice may resign as chief justice without resigning
from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by rule may
sit and render final judgment either en banc or in
divisions.
The court shall not declare any law
unconstitutional
under
this
constitution
or
the
Constitution of the United States, except on the
concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme
Court. If a justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified
or otherwise unable to participate in a cause before the
court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief
justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the
remaining justices, shall call an active judge from an
appellate court or the district court to participate in
the cause.
5.

CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §3:

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions
of state law certified by a court of the United States.
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over
all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute,
and the power to issue all writs and orders necessary for
the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.

vii

6.

CONST. OF UTAH Article VIII §4:

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall
by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by
the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all
members of both houses of the Legislature. Except as
otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges
and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in
Utah.
The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law and
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
practice law.
C.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:

1.

UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-1 et sea.

The following are minimum standards to be provided
by each county, city and town for the defense of indigent
persons in criminal cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person
who faces the substantial probability of the
deprivation of his liberty;
(2) Afford timely representation by competent
legal counsel;
(3)
Provide the investigatory and other
facilities necessary for a complete defense;
(4)
Assure undivided loyalty of defense
counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of
right and prosecuting of other remedies before
or after a conviction, considered by the
defending counsel to be in the interest of
justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ
proceedings.
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D.

RULES

1.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

(a)

Rule 8(a):

A defendant charged with a public offense has the
right to self-representation, and if indigent has the
right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces
a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty.
(b)

Rule 25(a)

In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either put its own
initiative or upon application of either party order an
information or indictment dismissed.
3.
(a)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 30(b)

If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial
shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court.
If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or
modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified
shall be executed. [Emphasis added].
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THE STATE NOW CONCEDES THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
MADE FINDINGS WHICH WERE "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" AND WHICH
WERE "AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE," AND
BECAUSE THE STATE NOW CONCEDES THAT COMMISSIONER
GALLIAN'S LAWFIRM HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THAT ITS
NAMED COUNSEL, J. MACARTHUR WRIGHT "RAN AFOUL OF BROWN,"
APPELLANT DOES NOT REARGUE THOSE POINTS HERE
The State has conceded that (a) The District Court erred in
imputing only a landlord-tenant relationship between Commissioner
Gallian's lawfirm and Defense Counsel; (b) Gallian's conflicts of
interest must be imputed to defense counsel J. MacArthur Wright,
and (c) Mr. Wright "ran afoul of Brown."

The State now confesses

reversible error as to a Brown conflict.

Appellant does not

reargue those points.

POINT II
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY IS FOR THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TO
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CONVICTION, ON THE MERITS AND WITH
PREJUDICE. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS THAT AUTHORITY.
IF THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT SO DISMISS THEN RATHER THAN
VACATE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IT SHOULD RESERVE TO HER
THE ELECTION OF PLEA WITHDRAWAL OR HOLDING THE STATE TO
ITS BARGAIN. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ALSO MANDATE THAT
IF APPELLANT DOES ELECT TO WITHDRAW HER PLEA THAT SHE
CANNOT BE CHARGED OR SENTENCED MORE SEVERELY THAN SHE WAS
BEFORE SHE BROUGHT THIS APPEAL AND CHALLENGED WASHINGTON
COUNTY'S ONGOING PRACTICES WHICH DENIED TO HER THOSE
GUARANTEED AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF EFFECTIVE AND WHOLLY
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL.

Appellant does NOT submit that the appropriate remedy of
Washington County's open and knowing and ongoing contempt for the
Utah Supreme Court's mandate in Brown is Vacation of Ms. Swanson's
conviction and remand of her case to a hostile and vindictive reprosecution in Washington County.

The State suggests in its

"confession" of error that "Vacation" is appropriate.
disagrees.

Appellant

The proper remedy is dismissal of the conviction, by

the Utah Supreme Court, under its inherent and supervisory powers,
as articulated in UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. VIII §2:

"The Supreme

Court by rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or
in divisions...."

Further, the Court may dismiss as a sanction

for the prosecution's knowing maintenance of an inherent and
ongoing scheme of public defender selection and retention which
created an blatant and perpetual conflict of interest even well
after

Brown

attention.

was

published

and

brought

to

the

prosecution's

Even then the prosecution and other players in the

Washington County justice system were not only indifferent but upon
being advised that its public defenders ran afoul of Brown,'became
wholly resistant to coming into compliance with Brown and took a
hostile and vindictive approach toward Ms. Swanson.
Finally, either appellate court has power to dismiss under
Rule 30(b), U.R.App.P.:

If a judgment of conviction is reversed,

a new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court
2

(Emphasis

added).

Clearly, appellate court remand for a new

trial is not mandated anywhere.
option among many.

To the contrary, it is but one

See also Rule 25(a), U.R.Crim.P., "Dismissal

without trial11 for further authority.

Surely ART VIII §1 does not

give the Utah Supreme Court less power than it does a district
court; nor do §§2, 3, or 4 of ART. VIII.
If the Court elects not to dismiss with prejudice and on the
merits, then the proper alternative is to remand the case to a new
district

court

judge

in

the

Third

District

or

some

other

jurisdiction, away from the mischief of cliquish, inbred rural
systems of "justice" for further proceedings, and through a new and
untainted prosecutor, with Ms. Swanson having the election of (a)
keeping her original plea bargain after being fully advised by
conflict-free counsel, or (b) withdrawing her plea and proceeding
to trial.

Again, the Supreme Court has those powers under ART.

VIII §§2 & 3, as well as under §4, which is the authority cited in
Brown, and in Barnard v. Sutliff, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1992).
Further, Washington County prosecutors should be restrained from
exerting any pressure on the new prosecutor to be vindictive in any
way or to treat Ms. Swanson differently than any other accused
person in her situation.

Ms. Swanson should not be punished for

exercising her inherent and inalienable rights including those
found in UTAH CONSTITUTION ART I §1, which include "...protest
3

against wrongs and petition for redress of grievances."

See also

amend 1, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Ms.

Swanson

should

not

be

punished

for

exercising

her

constitutional rights to conflict-free and competent legal counsel,
as guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 and the Utah and United
States Constitutional provisions cited above.

Accordingly, if

remanded, this Court or the Utah Supreme Court should expressly
limit the scope and maximum punishment of Ms. Swanson on re-trial,
if any, to not exceed that of her earlier conviction, including a
ceiling of 30 days incarceration.

Good public policy supports the

proposition that a defendant in a criminal case should not put
herself

at risk because she has through courage,

successfully

challenged an illegal status quo scheme, and helped to reform the
local justice system which so abused her ab initio.

Further, cases

such as State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, den. 116
L.Ed.2d 787, 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992) appear to support the principle.
But the better remedy, for purposes of finality, deterrence,
judicial economy, and equity, and justice, is simple and immediate
dismissal by the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to any of several
bases set forth above.

POINT III
APPELLANT'S NEW COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES;
4

THE COURT HAS POWER TO ORDER THEM; IT WAS WHOLLY
IMPOSSIBLE AND IMPRACTICAL FOR APPELLANT TO HAVE OBTAINED
ANY WHOLLY INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON COUNTY
PRIOR TO HER APPEAL EXCEPT FOR "WHITE KNIGHT" ASSISTANCE.
Appellant

adopts,

ratifies,

and

incorporates

herein

the

arguments made in the Reply Brief of Amicus regarding attorneys
fees.
It seems preposterous and inequitable to assert that those
whom the State admits acted unlawfully and unethically may be paid
for their knowing and wilful disregard of the Utah Supreme Courts
own mandate in Brown, yet a "white knight" must go uncompensated
for efforts which have concededly improved the delivery of justice
on a macro scale as well as in the specific case of Sonja Swanson,
an indigent with no other choice or recourse except for a "white
knight".

Such is not only inequitable but is wholly "Through the

Looking Glass" backward, illogical and legally topsy-turvy, and
should be declared unlawful here.
if

not

snaps

the

tenuous

Further, such approach strains

grip

defendants

should

have

on

Constitutionally guaranteed rights to effective and conflict-free
counsel.
Appellant also takes strong issue with the State's position in
its brief that Ms. Swanson has apparently abandoned the argument
[that the State acted in bad faith].
initial

Brief

nor

this

Reply

(Br. State 17). Neither her

Brief

understates

Appellant's

conviction that the State, among others, acted in bad faith in its
5

callous and concerted effort to deny Ms. Swanson conflict-free and
effective trial counsel, nor that it reached to absurd lengths at
the trial court level in an effort to support findings contrary to
fact, law, and common sense.

If this argument appears to be

"abandoned" then Appellant's briefs have only been half read.
Appellant further contests the State's suggestion at Br.State
19 that the State had "contracted with Doug Terry to handle cases
in which MacArthur Wright has a conflict."

Besides begging the

question as to how Ms. Swanson was expected to raise the issue
herself, when her own attorney resisted the proposition that he had
a conflict, the fact is that Doug Terry also made it clear in
writing and at the time that Mr. Wright had no conflict of interest
either.
In support of the above proposition, Appellant submits as
Attachment I, incorporated herein and made a part hereof, to wit:
a letter dated March 4, 1993 from civil rights attorney Brian
Barnard

to

the

Washington

County

Commissioners,

including

Commissioner Gallian, with copies to all three Washington County
Public Defenders, to wit:; MacArthur Wright, his son Jonathan
Wright, and aforementioned Douglas Terry.

The Bernard letter was

faxed the very day new counsel first appeared, and two days before
Ms. Swanson was to begin serving her jail term.

Mr. Barnard's

letter specifically addresses the conflicts raised in Brown.
6

The very next day the above-mentioned

Doug Terry hand-

delivered to current counsel for Appellant, and sent to all others
on the mailing list of the March 4, 1993 Barnard letter, his strong
reply to the same Barnard letter.

This letter from Doug Terry,

dated March 5, 1993, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof
as "Attachment II." In pertinent part the Terry letter states that
I take personal offense at Mr. Barnard's implied
accusations that either myself... or J. MacArthur Wright
have in anyway (sic) acted otherwise [than providing all
appointed clients with more than constitutionally
guaranteed representation].

It is wholly impractical and absurd to suppose that under the
circumstances then existing that Sonja Swanson had any chance
whatsoever in being appointed a conflict-free public defender,
particularly

before

her

immediate

date

with

the

illegally

overcrowded Washington County Jail, and particularly in light of
the District Court's extreme measures in making those findings
which even the State conceded in Point I-A of its brief were
"clearly erroneous (Br. State 13) and which were "against the clear
weight of the evidence" (Br. State 14).
In its argument, the State attempts to point out technical
reasons why attorneys fees were allegedly not sought or preserved
by, or available to, Defendant under the facts of this case.
In fact, Defendant did preserve his right to seek attorneys
7

fees on appeal.

See Mar. 12 Tr. 7:2-3:

But I donft want to waive any right to recover
anything under the appropriate circumstances.
This preservation was made in response to the Court's restricted
inquiry as to whether Mr. Huntsman was acting as "retained counsel
or as pro bono counsel."

Id. at 6:22-24.

The Court appeared to

frame the question in a way which precluded any other alternative.
There are other alternatives, and it was these alternatives
Defense Counsel had in mind when making the record, as cited above.
One such alternative, consistent with the Supreme Court's inherent
powers as spelled out in Brown, and §§2, 3, and 4 of ART. VIII,
would be for the Court to exercise its equitable powers and/or its
supervisory powers, in extraordinary cases, and award attorney fees
in "White Knight" cases such as this, where realistic alternatives
to preserve Ms. Swanson's rights under amends 6 and 14 of the
United States Constitution and Art I §§7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution simply did not exist nor were permitted to exist.
Several states have, through precedent, not statute, permitted
such fees under a variety of names, including the "private attorney
general" theory, "common fund" theory, or "common benefit" theory.
The instant case is intended to provide a common benefit for those
whom the system callously derails.
In the case of Deras v. Meyers 535 P.2d 541 (Ore. 1975), a
candidate for state office was awarded attorney fees in prevailing
8

on an attempted denial of a state constitutional right. The Oregon
court stated that Deras1 victory benefitted "all members of the
public" by enforcing "the interest of the public in preservation of
the

individual

liberties

guaranteed

infringement of the constitution."

against

governmental

Xd at 550.

The State of Washington, likewise, recognizes four separate
equitable grounds upon which an award of attorneys fees may be
made, even in the absence of statutory authorization or contract.
These grounds include (1) bad faith conduct of the losing party;
(2) preservation of a common fund; (3) protection of constitutional
principles; and (4) private attorney general actions.

See, e.g.,

Public Utility Dist. lv. Kottside, 545 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976) ; Miotke
v. Spokane, 678 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1984).
Other states which value their citizens1 constitutional rights
with similar precedent include California, Alaska, and Idaho, among
others.
Most cases authorizing an equitable basis for attorneys fees
require that there exist a large number of people benefiting from
the action, or that a substantial constitutional right be affected,
or that the state is acting in bad faith, and/or that private
enforcement is necessary.
Clearly a substantial constitutional right is at issue here.
There is no question that Defendant will not be and has not been
9

the only person treated so contemptuously by the criminal justice
system in Washington County.

Defendant believes that the record is

clear, that the state at the trial level acted in bad faith, and
denied her a fundamental constitutional right, and that through her
challenge many others will benefit and the system of justice will
be improved.

Defendant has also demonstrated, on the record, that

but-for the "white-knight11 intervention no protection whatsoever
would have occurred to her fundamental trial rights.
As

to

the

numerous

"Catch

22" blocks

to

any

meaningful

representation being available to Ms. Swanson in the environment
existing then and there, Appellant respectfully refers the Court to
the excellent Reply Brief of Amicus.

In short, there was not and

is not any real-world, meaningful opportunity for Ms. Swanson to
have obtained conflict-free counsel but for the intervention of
"white knight" counsel.

That such a situation is allowed to exist

neither deters prosecutorial or other misconduct or speaks well of
the

failure

of

Constitutionally

our
based

citizens1

government

liberties

and

to

protect

protections,

their

which

are

supposedly guaranteed by that government. The Utah Supreme Court
has the inherent powers found

in ART VIII

§§2, 3, and

4, in

addition to the several theories raised and preserved by Appellant,
to

correct

that

injustice,

and

attorneys fees to Appellant.
10

it

should

do

so

by

awarding

POINT IV
"SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER OF APPEAL TO THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT" WAS FILED ON AUGUST 5, 1993, AND SHOULD BE GRANTED
NOW THAT BRIEFING IS COMPLETED.
The issues raised above require that the Supreme Court of Utah
exercise its inherent and supervisory powers under the Constitution
of the State of Utah, as cited above.
Appellant has already filed, on August 5, 1993, a "Suggestion
for Transfer of Appeal to Utah Supreme Court"
copy of same].

[Attachment 3 is

On November 3, 1993, Hon. Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge of the Utah Court of Appeals, Ordered that "a
ruling

on

the

suggestion

for

transfer

completion of briefing of the case".

[be]

deferred

pending

See Attachment 4, Order,

incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
Briefing

is now completed, and Appellant now

respectfully

requests that this transfer be made to the Utah Supreme Court for
argument and ruling.

POINT V
BECAUSE OF PROFESSED CONFUSION SURROUNDING, AND OPEN
DEFIANCE OF, THE SUPREME COURT'S EARLIER BROWN MANDATES,
"BRIGHT LINE" GENERAL ORDER BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IS
NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF BROWN AND, MORE
IMPORTANTLY, TO MEANINGFULLY DETER ITS WANTON DISREGARD
BY INBRED, CONFLICT-RIDDEN LOCAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS.
The scope of Brown needs to be clearly articulated by the Utah
11

Supreme Court. Even so, the Utah Supreme Court's existing mandates
in

Brown,

which

are

directed

to

public

defenders,

counties,

prosecutors, and local government officials, are all too often
ignored or treated with contempt by those whose duty it is to
assure its compliance.

And why should cynical and conviction-

driven justice systems "do the right thing" by obeying a Supreme
Court mandate when no risk whatsoever
disregard?

attaches to its blatant

Mere reversal and remand is no more of a meaningful

deterrent to official lawlessness than is Brer Fox's remanding Brer
Rabbit back to the Briar Patch.
Accordingly, a bright-line Order should specify meaningful
remedies,

with

"teeth",

such

as

dismissal

of

charges

with

prejudice, and on the merits; attorneys fees for "white knight"
lawyers who provide the only meaningful alternatives to conflictridden

public

defenders,

and

other

remedies

which

will

make

prosecutorial mischief truly risky to the State, not to an already
victimized supplicant.
The bright-line Order should also promulgate a rule forbidding
any government attorneys and/or their associates from criminal
representation.

Opinion No. 126 of the Ethics Advisory Opinion

Committee of the Utah State Bar, which the State refers to in Br.
State

23,

should

be

integrated

into

an

Order,

so

that

its

precedential effect and use at trial is not at risk of being deemed
12

tangential or irrelevant as "only11 an "ethical opinion."

POINT VI
WHERE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE ARGUMENTS IN AND THRUST
OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, APPELLANT RESPECTFULLY
RATIFIES AS ITS OWN, AND INCORPORATES HEREIN, THE REPLY
BRIEF OF AMICUS.
As to all other arguments and articulations in the Reply Brief
of Amicus where not inconsistent with Appellant's Reply Brief here,
Appellant hereby ratifies and incorporates same as if same were
part of her own Reply Brief here.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully refers this Court to her August 5, 1993
"Suggestion for Transfer of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court."
Upon such transfer, the Supreme Court is respectfully requested to
assert its inherent and supervisory powers and authority—as it did
in Brown—and (1) find that Appellant was in fact denied conflictfree

and

therefore

effective

legal

representation

below,

(2)

dismiss her conviction with prejudice and on the merits, (3) award
attorneys fees to her "white knight" counsel, including the Utah
Chapter of the ACLU, and (4) promulgate a "bright line" order which
so clarifies the scope of Brown, and provides such meaningful
remedies as requested above, that players in the criminal justice
13

system will no longer blatantly violate Brown and other Court
mandates with impunity.

/

Respectfully submitted this /&

'day of

^K

1994.

R. CLAVtOlt'HUNTSMAN
Attorney for 'Defendant and
Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING
da
On the
/£/
Y o f MaY> 1994, I do hereby certify that I
mailed a true and complete copy of the above and foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF by placing same in the United States Post
Office, postage prepaid, to the following, to wit:

J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
ZT CLAYTOI
Attorney/tor Appellant-Defendant
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ATTACHMENT 1

March 4, 1993
The Hon. Russell Gallian
The Hon* Jerry Lewis
The Hon, Gayle Allred
Washington County Commissioners
Washington County Offices
197 East Tabernacle
St. Georgef Utah 84770
Re:

Provision of Independent Legal Counsel
to Indigent Defendants in Washington County

Dear Commissioners:
I write to you regarding an issue of grave concern with
regard to the County's statutory obligation to provide
independent legal counsel for the representation of indigent
defendants in criminal proceedings in Washington County,
Utah. I have enclosed a copy of Ut. Code Ann. § 77-32-1
(1953 as amended). You should especially note subsection
four (sub-§ (4)) that the county shall "[ajssure undivided
loyalty of defense counsel to the [indigent defendant]
client."
My understanding is that Washington County is and has
been for some time, providing such legal services to
indigents through contracts with three (3) individual
attorneys, Douglas Terry, Esq., Jonathan Wright, Esq. and/or
MacArthur Wright, Esq.
I call to your attention
Court in the case of State of
Case No. 90-0148,
P.2d
November 30, 1992); a copy is

a decision of the Utah Supreme
Utah v. Donald Wayne Brown,
, 201 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (decided
enclosed.

The Brown case held that it was unquestionably improper
and the basis for an automatic reversal of a criminal
conviction if appointed legal counsel for an indigent
defendant, i,e, a public defender, also concurrently serves
as a prosecutor. Brown.
P.2d
, 201 Utah Adv.Rep. at
7 - 8 (Utah 1992) . A copy of the decision in Brown is
attached for your review.

I have information that Douglas Terry, in addition to
serving as one of the Washington County legal defenders is
the City Attorney of LaVerkin, Utah, and serves in a
prosecutorial function on behalf of that city*
I have information Jonathan Wright and MacArthur Wright
are law partners with Russell Gallian in the St. George law
firm of Gallian, Westfall and Wilcox• I understand that
Russell Gallian is the City Attorney of Ivins, Utah, and
serves in a prosecutorial function on behalf of that city.
And, of course, in addition, Russell Gallian as a County
Commissioner has control over the legal defender contract
and some input as to the conduct of the Washington County
prosecutor.
Rule 1.10 (a), Imputed Disqualification: General Rule,
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
provides:
While lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so
by Rules 1.7, • . •
One of the basis for the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Brown were the considerations found in Rule 1.7 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
My initial review of the foregoing indicates that every
indigent defendant in Washington County that has been represented by Jonathan Wright, MacArthur Wright or Douglas Terry
as legal defenders since November 30, 1992 and has plead
guilty or has been found guilty after trial has the basis
for a challenge to their conviction. Those challenges could
take the form of an appeal or the form of a habeas corpus
proceeding.
In addition, each of
a civil rights (42 U.S.C.
County for its failure to
as required by the United

those defendants has the basis for
S 1983) action against Washington
provide independent legal counsel
States Constitution and state law.

Finally, it would appear that each such defendant could
bring a malpractice action against these attorneys alleging
violations of their rights and inadequate representation.

2

I bring this matter to your attention and asked that
you take immediate action to assure all indigent defendants
in Washington County adequate legal presentation in full
compliance with the mandate of Brown and your statutory duty
to provide "an attorney of undivided loyalty" to them.

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney at Law
BMB/pdq

cc:

Eric Ludlow, Esq*
Washington County Attorney
Jonathan Wright, Esq.
MacArthur Wright, Esq.
Douglas Terry, Est.
Clayton Huntsman, Esq.
Kathryn Kendell, Esq.
A.C.L.U*
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ATTACHMENT 2

DOUGLAS D. TERRY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
150 North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone (801)628-4411
Facsimile (801) 628-9260

March 5, 1993

Washington County Commissioners
197 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Re: Washington County Indigent Defense Contracts
Dear Commissioners:
I have just received by facsimile a letter under the letterhead of ffUtah Legal Clinic" dated
March 5, 1993, and signed by Mr. Brian M. Barnard. I believe the letter warrants my
response. As you know, I have been under contract with Washington County for the
representation of indigent defendants for a number of years. I have tried to perform my
duties in that capacity in a professional and competent manner and have done my utmost
to provide all of my-appointed clients with more than the constitutionally guaranteed
representation. I take personal offense at Mr. Barnard's implied accusations that either
myself, Jonathan Wright or J. MacArthur Wright have in anyway acted otherwise.
It is true that I am under contract with the City of LaVerkin to act as their city attorney and
have been so engaged for the last six years. However, LaVerkin City closed its justice court
three years ago and since that time my contract with the city has included no prosecutorial
responsibilities. Any criminal matters which occur within the City of LaVerkin are
investigated by the Washington County Sheriffs Office and are referred to the Washington
County Attorney's Office to be prosecuted in the Fifth Judicial District Court. In fact, there
is an express agreement between myself and the City of LaVerkin that, due to my
representation of indigent defendants, I cannot and will not prosecute any criminal cases.
Like Mr. Barnard, I too am aware of the Brown case, however, my reading of the opinion
appears to differ somewhat from his. It is true that under the ruling in Brown no attorney
who has lf prosecutorial duties" can act as counsel for indigent defendants. The reasons set
forth in the ruling are obvious. However, I find nothing in the opinion to suggest that the
Utah Supreme Court meant to disqualify city attorneys with strictly civil law responsibilities
from acting as criminal defense attorneys. The opinion contains no such language and I do
not believe the ruling goes that far. Certainly, the policy consideration supporting the ruling
do not have the same application with respect to a city attorney who does not prosecute any
criminal cases.

Page 2
March 3, 1993
I will continue to do my utmost to provide my indigent clients with adequate and
independent legal representation and assure you that they will have my xmdivided loyalty.
Should you have any questions at all concerning this matter please do not hesitate to contact
me.

DDTrdap
pc:

Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney
J. MacArthur Wright
Jonathan Wright
Kathryn Kendell, ACLU (by facsimile)
Brian M. Barnard
Alan D. Boyack
R. Clayton Huntsman

I - / ^ U O L A 5 u.
150

NORTH

SECOND

TERRY
EAST, S U I T E

202

ST. GEORGE, UTAH 8 4 7 7 0

R* Clayton Huntsman
2 West St. George Blvd.
St, George, Utah 84770
HAND DELIVERY

ATTACHMENT 3

Mj>iri/
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN - 1600
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31
P.O. Box 1425
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-2846
Fax No.: (801) 628-3049
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee

]>
)
]l

vs.
SONJA SWANSON
Defendant and Appellant

SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER
OF APPEAL TO UTAH
SUPREME COURT

1
>

Appellate Court No.
930160-CA

Comes now defendant-appellant herein, Sonja Swanson, by and
through

her

respectfully

attorney
moves

the

of

record,

Utah

Court

R.
of

Clayton
Appeals

Huntsman,
to

and

consider

transferring this case to the Utah Supreme Court.
Reasons for this suggestion are set forth in defendantappellant's Docketing Statement, in §9, "Determination of Case by
Supreme Court," on p. 13, as per Rule 9(c) (7) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
While technically this is simply an appeal from a final
judgment involving plea and sentence on a second-degree felony, the
basis and authority central to Appellant's position involve the
constitutionally authorized inherent supervisory power over courts
1

and attorneys.

Further, it appears from UTAH CONST. ART. VIII §

that only the Supreme Court shall by rule "govern the practice of
law".
Integrated in this appeal is the scope of State v. Brown, 201
Utah Adv. Rep.4 (1992) . The instant case thus presents or involves
a substantial constitutional issue not yet fully decided and, to
the extent decided to what extent compliance is expected by lower
courts and others. Also, this case presents a substantial issue of
first impression in the state and, most importantly of all, of
substantial importance in the administration of justice—i.e.,
whether Brown conflicts apply to law partners, associates, office
sharers, etc. or only to the individual attorney.
Regardless of the outcome of this case in the Utah Court of
Appeals, the case significance is such that it is highly likely
that one side or the other will seek review by the Utah Supreme
Court.

Further, Appellant

is supported by several who have

expressed interest in being "Friends of the Court."
Thus several good reasons appear in support of the Utah Court
of Appeals' referring this case to the Utah Supreme Court for

2

ultimate determination.
DATED this <~>

day of

, 1993

CLAYTON ^UNTSMAN
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
CERTIFICATE O

SERVICE BY MAILING

4sS
On the J
day of
1993, I do hereby
certify that I mailed a true pd complete copy of the above and
foregoing SUGGESTION FOR TRANSFER OF APPEAL TO UTAH SUPREME by
placing same in the United States Post Office, postage prepaid, to
the following, to wit:

Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

R. CI^TOtf HUNTSMAN
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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ATTACHMENT 4

Utah Court of Aopeals

7IN

\^

KOV Q 3 t£23

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ill'

00O00
•j/-

State of Utah,

J;^ry T. Noonan
ClifK of trja Court

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 930160-CA

v,
Sonja Swanson,
Defendant and Appellee.

This matter is before the court on appellant's Suggestion
for Transfer of Appeal to Utah Supreme Court.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a ruling on the suggestion for
transfer is deferred pending completion of briefing in the case.
Dated this^#t

day of November, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

Judith M . B i l l i n g s ,

Presiding
aiding Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
'I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of November, 1993, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the party listed below:
R. Clayton Huntsman
Attorney at Law
2 West St. George Boulevard, Suite 31
P.O. Box 1425
St. George, UT 84770
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney
General's Office to be delivered to the party listed below:
Jan Graham
State Attorney General
Governmental Affairs
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Dated this 3rd day of November, 1993.

Deputy Clerk

